Emma Shortis, Adjunct Senior Fellow, School of Global, Urban and Social Studies, RMIT University
Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Georgia, Nevada, Arizona, North Carolina.
In a repetitive, anxiety-inducing mantra, media coverage of the US presidential election between former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris recites these seven states over and over again.
The winner will almost certainly be decided by these states – perhaps a few of them, or maybe just one.
Depending on your particular interpretation of the electoral map, the mantra might just be Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania. Or could it be Wisconsin, Wisconsin, Wisconsin? Or perhaps it’s Georgia, Georgia, Georgia.
Some analysts argue that to win, Harris needs to hold on to the “blue wall” of Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin, three predominantly white states with large numbers of working-class voters. In 2016, Democrats were devastated by Trump’s sundering of this wall – he narrowly won all three.
The Democratic victor in 2020, Joe Biden, rebuilt the wall with three wins in these states. (In fact, Biden won six of the seven battleground states in 2020, losing only North Carolina.)
In this year’s campaign, Harris needs to keep it standing, while the Trump campaign is hoping to break it down again.
But it’s also possible for some cracks to appear in the “blue wall” – if Harris can hold on in Pennsylvania, there is a path to victory for the Democrats through the remaining battleground states.
The Trump campaign is, meanwhile, hoping it can repeat 2016 and break down the blue wall, particularly by winning the iconic rust-belt state of Michigan.
An outsize focus on ‘swing voters’
The critical role these seven states will play of course means they are the overwhelming focus of both campaigns and the media that covers them. Trump and Harris and their running mates have visited Pennsylvania and Michigan dozens of times, while residents of these states are being subjected to wall-to-wall television advertising.
The other states are, effectively, stitched up for one side or the other.
There’s no real possibility of Trump winning solidly Democratic New York or California. And no chance Harris could win deep-red Wyoming or Tennessee.
In the American democratic system, presidential elections are decided not via a national popular vote but the enslavement-era Electoral College (alongside widespread voter suppression). As a result, vast swathes of the American electorate are effectively disenfranchised.
In the states that are in play, the polling margins are razor-thin, just as they have been in most elections this century.
In 2020, for example, Biden won the popular vote by a four-point margin – seven million votes. But in the Electoral College, which is what actually decides the winner, Biden won by around 45,000 votes: 10,457 in Arizona, 11,779 in Georgia, and 20,682 in Wisconsin.
While polls are only one indicator – and they aren’t always that reliable – they do suggest the result in the seven battleground states in 2024 may be that close again.
That’s why both Harris and Trump have been spending so much time in those states. And it’s why their campaigns – as well as the media’s attention – are focused on finding as many voters in those places as they can.
And because of the way the American electoral system works, this focus is disproportionately placed on certain types of voters – or “swing voters”.
Both campaigns are chasing voters who may have gone for Trump in 2016 and then Biden four years later. They’re chasing “shy” Republicans or Democrats – voters who may be generally inclined to vote for one party or the other, but for whatever reason (usually, the particular candidate) are quiet about their choices.
Since the role of the “blue wall” in both electoral politics and the American imagination is so pronounced, this means there’s an inordinate focus (often unconsciously) on white swing voters, in particular.
Chasing the swing voters
These voters may indeed turn out to be the critical deciding factor.
But in American politics, it’s rarely one single thing that decides the outcome.
In a system that does not have compulsory voting, in which small numbers of voters in a small number of states can change the result, voter turnout is the main game. This election cycle, it could matter a great deal.
And that is why there is a hidden tension in both campaigns.
In Trump land, there has been consistent pressure (and unsolicited advice) on Trump to “moderate” his stances on particular issues in order to appeal to those “shy” or swing voters.
This is particularly the case with reproductive rights. It’s led to contradictory messaging from Trump – he’s taken full, individual credit for the overturning of Roe v. Wade while simultaneously insisting he is not supportive of extreme, right-wing positions on abortion bans.
Trump’s pick of JD Vance as his vice presidential running mate suggests his campaign decided not to focus mostly on swing or shy voters, but on mobilising and expanding their core voter base of white men. That is reflected in much of Trump’s media strategy and his consistent presence on right-wing podcasts.
But that is contradicted occasionally, and quite deliberately, by high-profile surrogates, including his wife.
The Harris campaign, on the other hand, seems to be attempting to divide its focus more evenly. Harris is chasing swing voters by going on Fox News and sharing a stage with former Representative and harsh Trump critic Liz Cheney. She also appeared with 100 Republicans at an event in Pennsylvania this month.
At the same time, the campaign is also attempting to drive turnout in key demographics for Democrats. Harris is targeting young women, particularly in the South, by going on popular podcasts like Call Her Daddy. Similarly, she is reaching out to Black men by appearing on platforms like Charlamagne tha God’s podcast in a live event in Detroit.
Does the strategy work?
The question for both campaigns is: does one of these tactics undermine the other?
Might the alliance between Democrats and the Cheney family’s deeply conservative stances on foreign policy, for example, further undermine or depress turnout in a state like Michigan, where outrage and betrayal over Democratic support for Israel may well be a deciding factor?
Alternatively, will Harris’ more hardline message on immigration depress enthusiasm amongst Black and Latino voters?
Similarly, might the Republican Party’s position on reproductive rights, and the consequences of the overturning of Roe v. Wade, mean Trump continues to lose support with women, which might not be countered by a sizeable boost in men’s turnout?
The answer is: we don’t know. And if the margins are indeed as close as the polling suggests, we may not know for some time after election day.
Until then, the mantra keeps repeating:
Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin, Georgia, Nevada, Arizona, North Carolina.
Emma Shortis is senior researcher in international and security affairs at The Australia Institute, an independent think tank.
