The implosion of the Titan submersible deep in the waters of the Atlantic Ocean, killing five people, could have been prevented, a hearing into the tragedy has been told.
The submersible's crew lost contact with its support vessel on June 18 last year about two hours after making its final dive.
The vessel had imploded, killing its five-member crew — OceanGate co-founder Stockton Rush, French diver Paul-Henri Nargeolet, British billionaire Hamish Harding, Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood and his 19-year-old son, Suleiman.
OceanGate owned the Titan and took it on several dives to the Titanic going back to 2021.
[MAP]The search for the submersible — which included ships, planes and other equipment rushed to an area about 700 kilometres south of St John's in the Canadian province of Newfoundland — attracted worldwide attention.
Wreckage of the Titan was found on the ocean floor about 300 metres off the bow of the Titanic, US Coast Guard officials said.
OceanGate, based in Washington state, suspended its operations after the implosion, which set off a worldwide debate about the future of private undersea exploration.
More than a year on, the US Coast Guard is still conducting its investigation into the incident, as part of which an 11-day hearing is underway in Charleston, South Carolina.
It is being headed by the Marine Board of Investigation (MBI) — the highest level of marine casualty investigation conducted by the US Coast Guard.
The timeframe for the subsequent investigation into the incident was initially set as a year, but the inquiry has taken longer.
When the hearing concludes, recommendations will be submitted to the US Coast Guard's commandant.
Here are the key takeaways from the first week of the hearing.
Titan engineer warned submersible was 'not working' in 2019
In the two-week hearing that began on Monday, former OceanGate employees have testified they knew the submersible was unsafe before its last voyage.
Among those voices was Tony Nissen, the Titan's lead engineer and the first witness called in to testify.
Mr Nissen told the MBI panel on day one of the hearing that he had refused to pilot the submersible for a journey a few years ahead of its implosion, but was still pressured to get it into the water.
He said the Titan was struck by lightning during a test mission in 2018, which might have compromised its hull.
When he stopped the Titan from visiting the Titanic in 2019, he said it was "not working like we thought it would". He was fired that year.
Mr Nissen said he was often in disagreement with OceanGate CEO Stockton Rush, who "most people" in the company would always eventually "back down to" owing to his difficult nature.
There was also "100 per cent" pressure to get the Titan into the water, Mr Nissen said.
US govt agency dismissed safety complaints on multiple occasions
David Lochridge, OceanGate's former operations director, said he had complained to a federal safety agency about the experimental vessel before its final voyage and believed the implosion could have been prevented if his complaint had been looked into.
"I believe that if OSHA [the Occupational Safety and Health Administration] had attempted to investigate the seriousness of the concerns I raised on multiple occasions, this tragedy may have been prevented," Mr Lochridge told the MBI panel.
"As a seafarer, I feel deeply disappointed by the system that is meant to protect not only seafarers but the general public as well."
Mr Lochridge said that eight months after he filed an OSHA complaint, a caseworker told him there were 11 cases ahead of his for investigation.
By then, OceanGate was suing Mr Lochridge and he had filed a countersuit. About 10 months after he filed the complaint, he decided to withdraw, meaning the OSHA case closed and both lawsuits were dropped.
"I gave them nothing, they gave me nothing," he said of OceanGate.
He was eventually fired after raising safety concerns about the company's operations in a 2018 report, he said.
Mr Lochridge also said he had "no confidence whatsoever" in the way the Titan was built, claiming OceanGate was purely committed to bringing in profits.
"The whole idea behind the company was to make money … there was very little in the way of science."
Crew sent 'all good here' before communication failed
Polar Prince before the submersible imploded stated "all good here", according to a visual re-creation the US Coast Guard had presented earlier in the hearing.
The crew lost contact after an exchange of texts about the submersible's depth and weight as it descended.
The Polar Prince then sent repeated messages asking if the Titan could still see the ship on its onboard display.
"There are no words to ease the loss endured by the families impacted by this tragic incident," said Jason Neubauer of the US Coast Guard Office of Investigations, who led the hearing.
"But we hope that this hearing will help shed light on the cause of the tragedy and prevent anything like this from happening again."
Coast Guard officials noted at the start of the hearing that the submersible had not been independently reviewed, as is standard practice.
That and the Titan's unusual design subjected it to scrutiny in the undersea exploration community.
The company's former finance and human resources director, Bonnie Carl, testified that she was aware of safety concerns about the Titan and that operations director David Lochridge had characterised it as "unsafe".
Tym Catterson, a contractor who worked with the company, told the marine board that "training and operations at sea could have been better".
Sub malfunctioned just before fatal dive
Steven Ross, OceanGate's scientific director, told the MBI panel of a platform issue the Titan experienced in June 2023, just days before it imploded.
The malfunction caused passengers to "tumble about", and it took an hour to get them out of the water.
Stockton Rush crashed into a bulkhead during the malfunction, Mr Ross said, adding that no one was injured, though he described it as uncomfortable.
"One passenger was hanging upside down. The other two managed to wedge themselves into the bow end cap," he said.
Mr Ross said he did not know if a safety assessment of the Titan or an inspection of its hull was performed after the incident.
'Delusional' to think any journey on Titan safe
Fred Hagen, identified as an OceanGate "mission specialist" on the witness list, was a paid passenger on another expedition to the Titanic wreck site on board the Titan sub in 2021.
Testifying on day four, Mr Hagen said that mission was aborted underwater when the submersible began malfunctioning.
It appeared to be off course on its way to the wreck site, so the crew decided to use thrusters to reset it on track, but it failed to activate.
"We realised that all it could do was spin around in circles, making right turns," Mr Hagen said. "At this juncture, we obviously weren't going to be able to navigate to the Titanic."
Mr Hagen said the Titan dropped weights, resurfaced and the mission was scrapped. He said he was aware of the potentially unsafe nature of getting in the vessel thereafter.
"Anyone that wanted to go was either delusional if they didn't think that it was dangerous, or they were embracing the risk," he said.
Mr Hagena and other witnesses have characterised mission specialists as people who paid a fee to play a role in OceanGate's underwater exploration.
OceanGate severed ties with research institutions after 'butting heads'
Dave Dyer of the University of Washington Applied Physics Lab also testified on day four to provide details about the lab's relationship with OceanGate while its submersible was in development and said the company and lab disagreed about fundamental aspects of its engineering.
OceanGate felt it was better to terminate the relationship and take over the engineering itself, Mr Dyer said.
"It was the engineering. We were butting heads too much."
Another Friday witness, Triton Submarines chief executive officer Patrick Lahey, recounted meeting OceanGate personnel in 2019 and getting a look at their submersible when it was in development. He said he "wasn't particularly impressed" by what he saw.
Mr Lahey stressed that it's important for submersibles to be accredited to ensure safety.
"I just said it looked to me like a lot of the stuff was not quite ready for prime time. And that there were many things in it that I thought had not been executed as appropriately as they should be," Lahey said.
Another witness, former OceanGate operations and engineering contractor Antonella Wilby, said she was criticised by company officials after coming forward with concerns about a banging noise during a 2022 dive.
Some people had a rosier view
Renata Rojas, a member of the Explorers Club, which lost two paid passengers in the fatal dive, struck a different tone with her testimony.
She said she felt OceanGate was transparent in the run-up to the dive and she never felt the operation was unsafe. A passenger on a previous dive, Ms Rojas was volunteering with the surface crew when the Titan imploded.
"Some of those people are very hardworking individuals that were just trying to make dreams come true," she said.
The hearings will resume next week.
ABC/Associated Press
